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A B S T R A C T
Children ﬁnd it challenging to self-monitor the quality of their own test responses, and are typically over-
conﬁdent. Inaccurate self-monitoring may not only be due to a metacognitive deﬁcit, but also to self-protective
biases. Therefore, monitoring peer performance and detecting others' errors may be easier than monitoring
oneself. This study investigated 97 children's (52 fourth and 45 sixth grade) feedback use when scoring their own
and their peers' concept learning. Children completed a concept-learning task, took a test, and then scored their
own responses and the responses of one of their peers with use of feedback standards. Error detection was better
for peer- than for self-score judgments. Further, monitoring was more accurate for older than younger children,
and inaccurate prior knowledge led to less accurate peer and self-judgments. Findings imply that, when im-
plementing co-scoring activities, it is important to be aware that its accuracy is aﬀected by children's age and
prior knowledge.
1. Introduction
In elementary school, integral to the process of developing knowl-
edge in diﬀerent school domains, children have to develop self-regu-
lated learning skills. That is, they need to be able to adapt to increasing
learning demands when studying in the classroom and when making
homework. Eﬀective self-regulated learning includes planning, prior-
itizing study tasks, allocating study time, and making use of appropriate
study strategies (Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013). To be able to self-
regulate learning, children need to self-monitor whether they are
making progress (Roebers, Krebs, & Roderer, 2014). Self-monitoring
predicts self-regulation; for instance, after identifying that certain ma-
terials are not yet well-learned, learning actions can be taken to achieve
learning goals, such as re-studying information or seeking help
(Zimmerman, 2000). However, self-monitoring of performance is
challenging for children; they have diﬃculties distinguishing between
well-learned and less well-learned items, and are typically over-
conﬁdent (Baars, Van Gog, De Bruin, & Paas, 2014). If learners cannot
accurately judge their current state of learning, adaptive self-regulation
is impossible because they do not know whether learning materials
should be selected or discarded from further study (Dunlosky &
Rawson, 2012). Therefore, inaccurate monitoring is disadvantageous
for learning (Destan & Roebers, 2015; Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault,
2003).
To improve self-monitoring and subsequent regulation and learning,
providing feedback on task performance seems beneﬁcial. Research
with adults (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012) and with fourth and sixth grade
elementary school children (Van Loon & Roebers, 2017) asked learners
to self-score their own responses when making use of feedback stan-
dards pointing out what correct performance should look like. This
feedback helped to compare responses with the standards, and this
improved monitoring (as measured with self-score judgments – SSJs)
and subsequent regulation (as measured with restudy selections).
However, some degree of overconﬁdence remained, indicating that
even when using feedback standards, incorrect or only partially correct
responses were not always recognized.
Children as well as adults are particularly overconﬁdent when
judging the quality of their own commission errors (i.e., entirely in-
correct responses; Dunlosky, Rawson, & Middleton, 2005; Finn &
Metcalfe, 2014). Also for partially correct responses, it is often believed
that these are fully correct (Van Loon, De Bruin, Van Gog, & Van
Merriënboer, 2013a). However, when inspecting work of others, it
seems easier to detect errors and incomplete responses. Already at a
young age, children more often recognize others' errors than their own
mistakes (Destan, Spiess, De Bruin, Van Loon, & Roebers, 2017; Ruble,
Eisenberg, & Higgins, 1994; Stipek & Hoﬀman, 1980). If children are
better able to judge their peers' than their own performance, this may
have educational implications, because peer assessment activities could
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then possibly enhance self-monitoring and self-regulation of learning
(Hwang, Hung, & Chen, 2014; Okita, 2014).
The present study aims to acquire insight into elementary school
children's judgments of their own and their peers' performance when
they are presented with feedback standards. The theoretical back-
ground for this study is provided by Vygotsky (1978), who argued that
learning is a social process, and that collaborative interactions with
peers are needed for this. Receiving peer feedback gives a student the
opportunity to acquire insights into a peer's interpretation of their re-
sponses, which task items have been mastered, and which items may
need improvement. Further, when giving feedback to a peer, children
can learn from demonstrating and applying their knowledge, and from
making comparisons with their own work (Carless & Boud, 2018; Nicol,
Thomson, & Breslin, 2014). Through collaborative metacognitive
learning activities, children can learn to apply the acquired insights into
peer performance to themselves (Okita, 2014). However, such activities
can only be successful when children are able to make accurate judg-
ments about their peers' actual ability (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich,
2006). Thus, before designing collaborative monitoring tasks, it is ﬁrst
important to investigate how well children can judge peer performance.
Importantly, during the course of elementary school, children's
ability to monitor learning undergoes strong development (Schneider &
Löﬄer, 2016). To acquire insight into the developmental trajectory of
children's ability to make self and peer judgments, we compared
judgment accuracy between fourth and sixth grade elementary school
children. Before clarifying the design of the present study, we ﬁrst give
an overview of the development of monitoring skills in elementary
school and potential reasons for children's inaccurate monitoring. Then,
we address eﬀects of feedback on the accuracy of self- and peer mon-
itoring.
1.1. Development of self-monitoring skills
Children's monitoring depends on the type of task they work on.
When they are asked to diﬀerentiate between correct and incorrect
answers for simple learning materials (e.g., when learning word pairs or
when learning spelling), self-monitoring skills seem well developed
when children are eight years of age (Roebers & Spiess, 2017; Schneider
& Löﬄer, 2016). However, children's ability to monitor more complex
learning and comprehension seems to undergo development over the
elementary school years, and metacognitive skills keep developing at
least until adolescence. When studying expository texts, children are
only able to monitor their learning to a moderate extent when they are
approximately 12 years old (De Bruin, Thiede, Camp, & Redford, 2011).
Further, children's ability to eﬀectively regulate their learning, and
appropriately select materials that are not yet well-learned for further
study develops from age ten onwards (Schneider & Löﬄer, 2016). Most
improvement in monitoring accuracy is seen in elementary school
children's error recognition skills. Before entering school, children are
able to judge their correct responses as being right (Lyons & Ghetti,
2013). However, error recognition is more demanding than reporting
how sure one is that performance is correct, and therefore, accurate
monitoring of incorrect performance seems to undergo development
during the elementary school years (Roebers, 2002, 2014).
Overconﬁdence remains an issue across the life span; most persons
believe they perform superior to others, while actually overestimating
their ability (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008),
and adults as well as children tend to believe that they are better-than-
average (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). However, throughout elementary
school, children become more skilled to strategically use valid in-
dicators (i.e., cues) of actual performance when making judgments
(Koriat, Ackerman, Lockl, & Schneider, 2009; Van Loon, De Bruin,
Leppink, & Roebers, 2017). Cues such as study time, experienced ease
of studying, the ease with which information comes to mind when
making a retrieval attempt, and one's ability to apply studied in-
formation in a novel context can all be valid when these give insights
into one's level of understanding and performance (Koriat, 1997; Van
Loon, De Bruin, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2013b). From the age of
ten onwards, children strategically base judgments on cues that are
related to their study and retrieval experiences, and this improves their
monitoring accuracy (Van Loon et al., 2017). Younger children are less
able to discriminate between correct and incorrect performance, and
are more overconﬁdent for errors. Instead of attending to actual in-
dicators of performance, they seem to be more biased by their wishes to
perform well (Stipek, 1984). Their tendency to give credit to most of
their incorrect responses may reﬂect their wishes to be rewarded for
their eﬀort (i.e., they use their eﬀort as a cue for their judgments).
During the course of elementary school, children become less biased by
wishful thinking (Schneider, 1998) and by the tendency to conﬂate
eﬀort with ability (Kurtz-Costes, McCall, Kinlaw, Wiesen, & Joyner,
2005), and this seems to explain developmental improvements in
monitoring accuracy.
1.2. Eﬀects of prior knowledge on monitoring accuracy
Learners' prior knowledge about a learned topic contributes to their
feelings of processing and retrieval ﬂuency, and these cues aﬀect their
monitoring judgments (Van Loon et al., 2013a). It is well known that
accurate prior knowledge beneﬁts achievement; prior knowledge makes
it easier to process information during study, and it supports the
building of a mental representation (Braithwaite & Goldstone, 2015).
This information is, subsequently, also easily retrieved when taking a
test, and students are likely to be highly conﬁdent that these responses
will be correct. College students who had high prior knowledge showed
better judgment accuracy than learners with low prior knowledge
(Griﬃn, Jee, & Wiley, 2009; Taub, Azevedo, Bouchet, & Khosravifar,
2014). However, to our knowledge, there are no documented eﬀects of
accurate prior knowledge on elementary school children's self-mon-
itoring.
Moreover, prior knowledge may also be inaccurate. Even though
this inaccurate prior knowledge is ﬂuently retrieved when taking a
learning test, using this inaccurate prior knowledge for a test response
will result in a commission error. Children's inaccurate prior knowledge
may not only be disadvantageous for learning achievement, but also for
self-monitoring accuracy (Van Loon et al., 2013a). Inaccurate prior
knowledge is hard to correct; even when the correct and contradicting
information is presented during study, misconceptions often remain
(Van den Broek & Kendeou, 2008). A study with third to sixth grade
elementary school children showed that inaccurate prior knowledge
was often not corrected during study, and that children were over-
conﬁdent and judged these pervasive errors as being correct (Van Loon
et al., 2013a).
1.3. Eﬀects of feedback on self-monitoring
One promising method to improve monitoring accuracy for children
and adults alike is to ask them to complete a self-test, and to score their
answers with use of feedback standards (Lipko et al., 2009; Rawson &
Dunlosky, 2007). Feedback is most beneﬁcial when it gives suﬃcient
detail about the ideas that learners should have mentioned in their test
responses (Lipko et al., 2009; Miller & Geraci, 2011). This way, learners
can become aware of the discrepancies between their actual perfor-
mance and the learning goals, and feedback can be a helpful tool to
support recognition and correction of errors (Hattie & Timperley, 2007;
Mory, 2004).
However, although inspection of feedback standards improved SSJs
and restudy selections for fourth and sixth graders (Van Loon &
Roebers, 2017), even after receiving feedback, children often expected
that they would get more credit points for their responses than they
would objectively receive. This persistent overconﬁdence seems at least
partially due to inaccurate prior knowledge, which could hinder feed-
back processing (Butler & Winne, 1995). Even though learners are often
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receptive to feedback and correct their misunderstandings, ﬁndings that
students are not always detecting errors when using feedback indicate
that in some cases feedback is ignored, rejected, or interpreted such that
it ﬁts inaccurate prior knowledge (Mory, 2004).
1.4. Children's peer-monitoring
Judgments that are made by peers may be more useful to give input
for regulation of learning than self-monitoring judgments. Although
self-monitoring seems to be based on experiential cues and self-serving
biases (Destan et al., 2017), when monitoring performance of peers,
more objective reasoning about performance quality may occur
(Efklides, 2008; Koriat & Ackerman, 2010; Thomas & Jacoby, 2013). To
successfully implement peer-scoring activities in elementary school,
ideally, peer-score judgments (PSJs) should be accurate. However, even
though learners seem to apply diﬀerent judgment criteria for peers than
for oneself, peer-score judgments do not always match objective per-
formance. After receiving feedback, error recognition may remain
challenging, not only when judging own performance, but also when
scoring peers (Ruble et al., 1994). When second and fourth grade
children inspected their own and a peer's writing task, they more often
detected errors that were made by their peers (Cameron, Edmunds,
Wigmore, Hunt, & Linton, 1997). Nevertheless, error detection was far
from perfect, fourth graders only corrected 30% of their own errors and
50% of their peer's errors. Further, children may apply more con-
servative criteria when judging peers than when judging themselves,
and this does not necessarily beneﬁt judgment accuracy. For instance,
when 7th grade middle school students gave themselves and their peers
grades for diﬀerent school tests, they underestimated peer performance
more than own performance (Sadler & Good, 2006).
The accuracy of PSJs seems to be aﬀected by developmental factors;
in addition to children's self-monitoring ability, their monitoring ac-
curacy for others' learning improves with age (Paulus, Tsalas, Proust, &
Sodian, 2014). Developmental improvement in error recognition was
observed by Cameron et al. (1997); fourth graders recognized more of
their peers' and their own errors than second graders. Moreover, chil-
dren's use of feedback for self- and peer-scoring improves with age
(Destan et al., 2017).
One's prior knowledge may also aﬀect the accuracy of PSJs.
Cameron et al. (1997) showed that accurate prior knowledge did not
only inﬂuence self-scoring but also peer-scoring; children who had
better writing abilities were better at error monitoring both for them-
selves, but also for their peers. And even though processing and re-
trieval ﬂuency cues can lead to overconﬁdence when prior knowledge is
inaccurate, presumably, these misleading experiential cues should not
bias PSJs as much as SSJs, because one has no insight into a peers'
subjective study and test experiences (Koriat & Ackerman, 2010).
Interestingly, although peer judgments seem to be based on dif-
ferent factors than self-judgments, research suggests a tight relation
between one's own monitoring processes and an understanding of
other's learning and performance (Koriat & Ackerman, 2010). As shown
by research with adult participants, estimates of performance of others
are based on judgments for oneself (Thomas & Jacoby, 2013). That is,
there may be consistency between judgments, such that judgments for
oneself and a peer are similar, even when there are diﬀerences in
performance. If this is the case, this may imply that children do not
necessarily base their judgments on objective performance criteria, but
instead, that for tasks for which they give themselves high scores they
also give their peers high scores, and vice versa. If it is the case that
judgments of peer performance are linked to estimates of own perfor-
mance, then overconﬁdence for oneself may also be related to over-
conﬁdence for a peer. However, although research indicates similarity
between judgments made for oneself and for others, it is unclear whe-
ther this is also the case for children. To acquire insight into this, we
assess the intra-individual consistency of judgments made for oneself
and for peers.
2. Present study
With this study, we aim to investigate the accuracy of self- and peer-
monitoring for fourth and sixth grade students. These age groups are
selected because in mid-elementary school, children need to become
skilled to self-regulate their learning. From age 10 onwards, children
start to base their study decisions on their monitoring (Dufresne &
Kobasigawa, 1989), and hence, monitoring accuracy becomes an im-
portant predictor for learning success (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012).
However, children's ability to monitor learning still develops between
the mid and late elementary school years (De Bruin et al., 2011; Krebs &
Roebers, 2010). It is thus likely that developmental diﬀerences aﬀect
children's scoring of their own and their peers' responses; to acquire
insights into this, the two age groups are compared. Moreover, the
study investigates eﬀects of children's accurate and inaccurate prior
knowledge, and the consistency within individuals between their SSJs
and PSJs.
After taking a pretest to assess prior knowledge, children studied
diﬃcult concepts, then they were tested for their understanding of these
concepts. After taking the posttest, children received feedback stan-
dards, and judged the quality of their own answers and the quality of
the answers that were given by a peer.
Indices of monitoring accuracy can be calculated with measures of
relative and absolute accuracy (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Relative
accuracy is measured with correlations between a person's self-mon-
itoring and performance, and indicates to what extent a person can
discriminate between test responses with high and low quality. To
further assess whether a learner was over- or underconﬁdent, a measure
of absolute accuracy is needed. For this measure, the magnitude of
judgments is compared with the objective performance scores; judg-
ments are accurate when deviations between judgment magnitudes and
performance are low. Test responses can range in quality (i.e., incorrect
responses, partially correct responses, and fully correct responses);
learners would be overconﬁdent when they give themselves more credit
for responses than they would objectively receive, and underconﬁdent
when monitoring judgments are lower than objective performance
(Pieschl, 2009). To acquire insights into relative and absolute accuracy,
both measures are used in the present study.
Our ﬁrst research question addresses whether there are diﬀerences
in monitoring judgments and monitoring accuracy between SSJs and
PSJs. This research question is addressed with measures of relative
accuracy, absolute accuracy, and for the diﬀerent test response types.
We expect diﬀerences between SSJs and PSJs, such that children are
more conservative when judging their peers' than their own responses.
However, we do not have speciﬁc hypotheses about whether making
more conservative judgments also improves relative and absolute
judgment accuracy for peers in comparison to oneself; this is addressed
exploratively. For analyses of the separate test response types, we ex-
pect to replicate ﬁndings by Van Loon and Roebers (2017) that re-
cognizing one's own commission errors is most challenging, and that
children are overconﬁdent for these errors. Moreover, children seem
better to detect their peers' than their own errors, we therefore hy-
pothesize that the diﬀerence between SSJs and PSJs is most pronounced
for commission errors, such that judgments are lower, and thus more
accurate for errors made by peers.
The second research question concerns developmental diﬀerences
between fourth and sixth graders in SSJs and PSJs. We expect better
relative and absolute judgment accuracy for sixth than for fourth gra-
ders when comparing SSJ accuracy and PSJ accuracy between grades.
Moreover, our third question addresses whether prior knowledge
aﬀects SSJs and PSJs. We predict that prior knowledge aﬀects SSJs,
such that high accurate prior knowledge scores are related to more
accurate relative and absolute self-monitoring, whereas inaccurate
prior knowledge is expected to be related to less accurate relative and
absolute self-monitoring. The eﬀect of accurate and inaccurate prior
knowledge on PSJs is addressed as an explorative question.
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Finally, research question four concerns the consistency between
SSJs and PSJs. Even though self- and peer-judgments are based on
diﬀerent judgment processes, at the same time, there may be con-
sistency between SSJs and PSJs. We therefore exploratively address to
what extent the magnitudes of the judgments, as well as judgment ac-
curacy, are related between self- and peer-monitoring judgments within
individuals.
3. Method
3.1. Participants
Participants were 97 children from the German speaking part of
Switzerland, 52 fourth graders (30 males, 22 females; M=10.37 years,
SD=6.3months) and 45 sixth graders (19 males, 26 females;
M=12.30 years, SD=5.2months). The sample was recruited from
public schools; family backgrounds were lower to upper middle class.
The study was realized in accordance with the APA ethical principles
and the declaration of Helsinki, and the Faculty Ethic Review Board of
the University of [information withheld] approved the research project.
With a letter, participants and their caretakers were informed about the
study, including information about conﬁdentiality of the data, that
participants could decline to participate or withdraw after starting
without any consequences, and that they could contact the ﬁrst author
if they had questions. Parental written consent was obtained, and when
introducing the study in the classroom, it was again emphasized that
participation was voluntary.
Participants were tested in their classroom, all children were used to
follow class instructions in the German language. Participation was
rewarded with a small gift.
3.2. Materials
Diﬃcult concepts served as stimuli for the concept-learning task, an
example of such a concept is ‘Ivory: Ivory is a white material, which comes
from the tusks of elephants and is often used to make small sculptures’.
Similar types of materials have successfully been used in previous stu-
dies with young learners (e.g., Lipko et al., 2009; Van Loon et al.,
2013a; Van Loon & Roebers, 2017). The task consisted of 14 concepts
for fourth graders and 16 concepts for sixth graders; selection of these
concepts was based on teaching materials and the learning objectives
outlined in the curriculum description for teachers. All concept deﬁ-
nitions consisted of 3 idea units (cf. Van Loon & Roebers, 2017); these
deﬁnitions were derived from a dictionary for elementary school chil-
dren. Before selecting concepts for the task, a pilot study was conducted
with participants in the same age range as the ﬁnal sample (17 fourth
graders, M=10.18 years, SD=0.44; 18 sixth graders,
M=11.98 years, SD=0.24). For this pilot, children completed a
pretest, study phase, and posttest for 24 concepts. Based on the pilot
study, concepts were selected that were diﬃcult, such that prior
knowledge would be low. However, for all selected concepts, posttest
scores were higher than pretest score, indicating that children in these
age groups were able to learn at least part of the concept deﬁnitions.
The task consisted of six phases, as shown in Fig. 1: (1) Pretest. To-
be-learned concepts were listed, with lines where children could write
down the meaning of the concepts. This pretest quantiﬁed prior
knowledge (i.e., for pretest items containing correct idea units, we
scored the percentage of correct ideas as accurate prior knowledge; the
pretest items which only contained incorrect idea units reﬂected the
percentage of inaccurate prior knowledge) (2) Learning phase. The
concepts and the concept deﬁnitions were presented to the children.
Furthermore, for each concept, an example sentence clariﬁed use of the
concept. (3) Posttest. Similar as in the pretest, children could write
down the meaning of each studied concept. (4) Restudy selections.
Concepts were printed in a grid (a 2×7 grid in fourth grade and a
2× 8 grid in sixth grade). With a checkmark, children could indicate
which concepts they would like to restudy. Note that there was no
actual restudy trial, and because the main focus of this research is on
monitoring accuracy, results on restudy selections are not further ad-
dressed. (5) Feedback phase. Children received feedback standards,
these listed the concepts and the deﬁnition as shown in the learning
phase; each deﬁnition was parsed into three idea units (in line with
Dunlosky, Hartwig, Rawson, & Lipko, 2010). (6) Judgment phase. With
use of the feedback standards, children made judgments about the
quality of their own and their peer's posttest performance (through
exchange of response sheets), by indicating in a check box (ranging
from 0 to 3 ideas) how many correct idea units they identiﬁed in the
given response. Judgments were made after the test responses were
provided and feedback was inspected, which is in line with research by
Dunlosky et al. (2010), Lipko et al. (2009) and Van Loon and Roebers
(2017).
All task materials were printed on paper and handed out in a ring
binder. There were three diﬀerent versions of the concept task for each
age group, the order of the items was diﬀerent in these versions. For
each subtask, the order of the concepts was changed.
3.3. Procedure
Two experimenters visited the classroom to test the children. Before
starting, they introduced the concept learning task, and they showed
children examples of concepts. They told children that each to-be-
learned concept consisted of three idea units, and that the aim was that
children would try to remember all three ideas, so they could reproduce
this when tested. Then, they showed the children the ring binders they
would receive, and they told them that, when they saw a blank page
with a large number on it, they should wait for further instructions.
Then the concept-learning task folders were handed out with blue pens
to complete the pre- and posttest. After each phase, there was a num-
bered page that indicated children to stop and wait for experimenter
instructions before they went to the next phase. This way, the test time,
the learning time and the time provided for inspecting feedback and
making judgments was similar for all children.
When starting with the pre-test, children were told to write down
the meaning of the concept if they thought they knew it, and they were
told that they could leave it blank if they did not know the concept. The
pre-test phase took 8min. Then the learning task started, for 10min,
children studied concepts with deﬁnitions. After the learning phase,
children could mark the concepts they would like to restudy. They then
took the open-ended test, this phase lasted 12min. Subsequently, they
received feedback standards which contained the correct answers to the
test questions, separated in three idea units. Children were told to
compare the feedback standards with the test responses, and to use the
feedback to make judgments about their own and their peer's responses.
They were instructed that they had to assess the quality of these test
responses, by indicating how many of the idea units were presented. To
make sure that they would not change their responses after receiving
feedback, they were told to make the judgments with a red pen; the
blue pens were collected, and red pens were handed out. Children had
10min to make the SSJs and 10min to make PSJs. The order of making
SSJs and PSJs was counterbalanced, so that 50% of the children ﬁrst
made SSJs, the others ﬁrst made PSJs. That is, the children who had an
S printed on their booklet were told to ﬁrst make self-score judgments,
and after instructions, exchange their test booklet with the peer who
was sitting diagonally behind them (or diagonally in front of them,
respectively). The children who had a P on their booklet ﬁrst exchanged
their booklet with their peer, and after instructions, they received their
own booklet back to make SSJs. Children were instructed about the
exchange and whether they either had to score their own answers or
their peer's answers ﬁrst. They did not receive instructions about
whether they should compare their own with their peer's judgments.
Ring binders were handed out such that the matched pairs had the same
task version, to ensure that the similar feedback standard could be used
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when scoring oneself and when scoring the peer. The full procedure
took approximately 60min.
3.4. Scoring
Each concept deﬁnition consisted of three idea units. Similar as in
Van Loon and Roebers (2017), the number of correct ideas (ranging
from 0 to 3) were scored both in the pretest and the posttest responses.
Idea units were scored when either provided literally or when con-
taining the gist of the original idea unit. When no response was given at
all, the answer was scored as an omission. When a completely incorrect
response was given, this answer was scored as a commission error. After
extensive discussion about scoring criteria, the experimenters coded the
responses. To assess interrater reliability, 20% of the pre- and posttest
responses were scored by both raters, agreement was high: ICC for the
pretest= 0.87; ICC for the posttest = 0.86.
3.5. Analyses
For each participant, based on pretest data, the percentage of ac-
curate prior knowledge and the percentage of inaccurate prior knowl-
edge were calculated, and used as independent variables in the analyses
to predict judgment accuracy. The correlations between the percentage
of accurate prior knowledge responses and inaccurate prior knowledge
responses were low to moderate (overall r=−0.24; r=−0.31 for the
fourth grade and −0.04 for the sixth grade), indicating no issues with
multicollinearity (Mansﬁeld & Helms, 1982).
To assess performance, the number of correct idea units in test
performance scores was calculated. Dependent variables in our analyses
are magnitudes of SSJs and PSJs, and the accuracy of SSJs and PSJs.
SSJs were related to objective performance to assess self-monitoring
accuracy. Further, because tests were exchanged between children, the
accuracy of children's PSJs could also be related to performance for this
particular peer.
Both for fourth and sixth graders, there were no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
task version on performance, mean SSJs, and mean PSJs (all ps > 11).
Therefore, data from all versions are combined in the reported analyses.
Moreover, the order of making SSJs and PSJs did not aﬀect relative and
absolute judgment accuracy (all ps > 0.17), therefore, the data from
the group who ﬁrst made SSJs and the group who ﬁrst made PSJs are
collapsed.
4. Results
In this section, we ﬁrst present preliminary analyses on prior
knowledge, test performance, and SSJs and PSJs. Then we address
diﬀerences between self and peer monitoring, eﬀects of accurate and
inaccurate prior knowledge, and the consistency between SSJs and
PSJs. Results are reported and compared for the two grade levels.
4.1. Pre- and posttest performance and judgment magnitudes
Table 1 shows mean prior knowledge, posttest performance, and
SSJs and PSJs. As visible in this table, the sixth graders had more ac-
curate prior knowledge than fourth graders, t(95)= 2.71, p= .008.
Moreover, sixth graders had signiﬁcantly less inaccurate prior knowl-
edge than fourth graders, t(95)= 2.24, p= .027.
Further, Table 1 shows that posttest performance was signiﬁcantly
higher for sixth than for fourth graders, t(95)= 8.44, p < .001. As a
measure of actual learning, corrected for pre-test performance, we
computed a percentage diﬀerence score between post- and pre-test
performance. In total, fourth graders produced 13.79% (SD=11.28)
more concept idea units at the posttest than at the pretest; the sixth
graders showed 32.34% (SD=14.35) improvement from pre- to
posttest. Sixth graders showed more improvement than fourth graders, t
(95)= 7.12, p < .001.
Monitoring judgments ranged from 0 (no correct ideas) to 3 (3
correct ideas). Table 1 shows that both for fourth and sixth graders,
Fig. 1. Task phases and procedure.
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PSJs were lower than SSJs. To investigate whether judgment magni-
tudes diﬀer between SSJs and PSJs (RQ1), general linear models (GLM)
for repeated measures were used to compare SSJs and PSJs. Magnitudes
of SSJs and PSJs were included as a within-subject factor, grade was
included as a between-subject factor to account for potential age dif-
ferences (RQ2). The GLM for repeated measures conﬁrms that magni-
tudes of PSJs were signiﬁcantly lower than SSJs, F(1, 93)= 17.76,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.16. Further, the main eﬀect of Grade, F(1,
93)= 23.52, p < .001, ηp2= 0.20, shows that sixth graders made
higher judgments than fourth graders.
4.2. Relative accuracy for self and peer judgments
To address RQ1 on whether there are diﬀerences in relative mon-
itoring accuracy between SSJs and PSJs, intra-individual Goodman and
Kruskal gamma correlations were calculated between SSJs and perfor-
mance, and between PSJs and performance (cf. Nelson, 1984). This
correlation indicates how strongly pairs of ordinal variables (judgments
and performance per item) are associated for each participant, and can
be interpreted as the proportion of ranked pairs in agreement. A gamma
correlation of +1 would show that items for which judgments were
high consistently received higher objective scores than items for which
judgments were lower.
Mean gamma correlations between performance and SSJs were 0.77
(SD=0.41) for fourth grade and 0.92 (SD=0.15) for sixth grade.
Gamma correlations between performance and PSJs were 0.69
(SD=0.42) for fourth grade and 0.89 (SD=0.18) for sixth grade.
Fig. 2 shows the relative accuracy for the self- and peer-judgments. GLM
analyses with relative accuracy for SSJs and PSJs as within-subjects
factor (RQ1) and grade as between-subjects factor (RQ2) did not show
diﬀerences between relative accuracy of SSJs and PSJs, F(1, 93)= 3.07,
p= .08. However, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of grade, F(1,
93)= 8.97, p < .001, ηp2= 0.09. As shown in Fig. 2, sixth graders
showed higher relative accuracy for self and peer monitoring judgments
than fourth graders.
Furthermore, follow-up regression analyses were used to investigate
evidence for RQ3 concerning eﬀects of accurate and inaccurate prior
knowledge on relative judgment accuracy. Accurate and inaccurate
prior knowledge are interval variables (since these are calculated as
percentage values per individual); the percentage of accurate prior
knowledge and the percentage of inaccurate prior knowledge were
added to the regression model. Moreover, to account for grade, this
variable was dummy coded and simultaneously entered. There were no
eﬀects of prior knowledge (accurate and inaccurate) on relative accu-
racy. That is, neither the percentage accurate prior knowledge
(b=−0.06, p= .56), nor the percentage of inaccurate prior knowl-
edge (b=−0.13, p= .22) predicted the relative accuracy of self-
scoring. Further, accurate (b=0.01, p= .90) and inaccurate prior
knowledge (b=0.10, p= .37) did not predict the relative accuracy of
peer-scoring.
4.3. Absolute accuracy of self and peer score judgments
4.3.1. Overall absolute accuracy
To assess absolute monitoring accuracy (to address RQ1), for each
participant, a measure of mean absolute accuracy was calculated by
assessing the deviation between judgments and objective performance
scores (cf. Schraw, 2009). Absolute accuracy can range from−3 to +3.
A smaller absolute accuracy value (i.e., closer to zero) indicates better
judgment accuracy; values above zero indicate that the participant was
overconﬁdent, whereas values below zero show underconﬁdence. Fig. 3
shows absolute accuracy for both age groups. Mean absolute accuracy
of the SSJs was 0.25 (SD=0.35) for fourth graders and −0.67
(SD=0.25) for sixth graders. Mean accuracy of the PSJs was 0.09 for
fourth graders (SD=0.33) and −0.11 for sixth graders (SD=0.22).
The ﬁnding that absolute accuracy values for fourth graders are above
zero, whereas values for sixth graders are below zero, indicates that
fourth graders had a tendency for overconﬁdence when scoring self-
and peers, whereas sixth graders tended to be underconﬁdent. In-
dependent sample t-tests show that absolute accuracy of fourth graders
SSJs was indeed signiﬁcantly higher than zero, that is, they were
overconﬁdent when monitoring their own responses, t(51)= 4.52,
p < .001, 95% CI=0.13–0.34. Although not signiﬁcant, when judging
peers, the trend seems to indicate that they were overconﬁdent, t
(50)= 1.93, p= .06, 95% CI= 0.00–0.18. In contrast to fourth gra-
ders, the non-signiﬁcant trend for sixth graders seems to indicate that
they were underconﬁdent when scoring their own responses, t
(43)=−1.92, p= .06, 95% CI=−0.15–0.00, and moreover, they
were signiﬁcantly underconﬁdent for PSJs, t(42)=−3.21, p= .003,
95% CI=−0.18–−0.04 (Fig. 3).
A GLM was used to investigate whether there are diﬀerences be-
tween the absolute accuracy of SSJs and PSJs (RQ1); accuracy of SSJs
and PSJs were included as within-subjects repeated measurements, and
to address RQ2, grade was included as a between-subject factor.
Table 1
Prior knowledge, posttest performance, and judgment magnitudes.
Prior knowledge: Correct idea units
(%)
Inaccurate prior knowledge
(%)
Posttest: Correct idea units
(%)
Self-score judgments (range
0–3)
Peer score judgments (range
0–3)
Grade 4 9.65 (5.73) 18.54 (18.01) 23.44 (12.94) 1.09 (0.60) 0.88 (0.59)
Grade 6 13.15 (6.96) 11.68 (10.62) 45.48 (12.69) 1.56 (0.50) 1.45 (0.48)
Note. Standard deviations of the mean in parentheses.
Fig. 2. Relative accuracy of self- and peer score judgments. (Error bars indicate
the 95% conﬁdence interval.)
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Absolute accuracy values were higher for SSJs than PSJs, indicate
higher deviation of judgments from performance, F (1, 91)= 7.67,
p= .007, ηp2= 0.08. Moreover, the signiﬁcant eﬀect of grade, F(1,
91)= 27.29, p < .001, ηp2= 0.23, shows that values for absolute ac-
curacy were higher for fourth than for sixth graders.
Moreover, regression analyses investigating eﬀects of prior knowl-
edge on absolute accuracy (RQ3) show that accurate prior knowledge
was not related to absolute accuracy of SSJs (b=0.07, t=0.72,
p=47). However, inaccurate prior knowledge signiﬁcantly predicted
absolute accuracy (b=0.20, t=2.08, p= .04). That is, children with
more inaccurate prior knowledge made less accurate judgments. For
PSJs, eﬀects of accurate prior knowledge were not-signiﬁcant
(b=−0.05, t=−0.509, p= .612), but inaccurate prior knowledge
signiﬁcantly predicted the accuracy of PSJs (b=0.25, t=2.513,
p= .014), such that children with more inaccurate prior knowledge
were less accurate when making judgments about peer performance.
4.3.2. Judgment magnitudes for the diﬀerent response types
To address RQ1 for children's ability to monitor the quality of dif-
ferent test response types, SSJs and PSJs were investigated for omis-
sions, commission errors, partially correct responses (containing either
one or two correct idea units) and fully correct responses (containing all
correct idea units) separately. Table 2 shows the SSJs and PSJs as a
function of response type. As indicated by this table, even though
omission errors were blank responses that did not contain any ideas at
all, for some omissions, children judged that these contained correct
ideas. A GLM analysis with SSJs and PSJs for omission errors as within-
subjects factor and grade as between-subjects factor shows that there
was no diﬀerence between SSJs and PSJ for omissions, F(1, 73)= 2.88,
p= .09, ηp2= 0.04. However, the eﬀect of grade was signiﬁcant, F(1,
73)= 9.73, p= .003, ηp2= 0.12, such that judgments for omissions
were lower for the sixth than for the fourth graders.
Children were overconﬁdent when making SSJs for commission
errors; both for fourth and sixth graders, judgments were signiﬁcantly
higher than zero; for fourth grade t(45)= 9.74, p < .001, for sixth
grade t(16)= 5.49, p < .001. A GLM analysis showed a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between SSJs and PSJs for commission errors, F(1,
60)= 7.33, p= .009, ηp2= 0.11, such that PSJs for commission errors
were lower than SSJs. There was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of grade, p= .42.
For the partially correct responses consisting of one correct idea
unit, a GLM shows that the diﬀerence between SSJs and PSJs was non-
signiﬁcant, F(1, 86)= 3.54, p= .06, ηp2= 0.04, although the trend
seems to indicate that PSJs were lower than SSJs. The eﬀect of grade
was non-signiﬁcant, p= .48. For the partially correct responses with
two correct idea units, a GLM shows that PSJs were signiﬁcantly lower
than SSJs, F(1, 83)= 8.29, p= .005, ηp2= 0.04. Although the eﬀect of
grade was not signiﬁcant, p= .51, there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between self-peer scoring and grade, F(1, 83)= 4.05, p= .048,
ηp2= 0.05. Follow-up paired t-tests show that the SSJs were sig-
niﬁcantly higher than PSJs for fourth graders, t(41)= 2.82, p= .007,
whereas there was no diﬀerence between these judgments for sixth
graders, t(42)= 0.85, p= .40. For the fully correct responses, a GLM
showed no diﬀerences between SSJs and PSJs, p= .59, and no eﬀect of
grade, p= .92.
4.4. Consistency
To investigate RQ4 about intra-individual consistency between
judgments, we investigate relations between the magnitudes, as well as
relations between judgment accuracy for self and peers. To investigate
the relation between the magnitude of SSJs and PSJs, we calculated
intra-individual gamma correlations between judgments made for
oneself and one's peer per item. These correlations were 0.11
(SD=0.64) for fourth graders and 0.10 (SD=0.56) for sixth graders,
and both gamma correlations were not higher than zero, ps > 0.23.
This shows that there was no signiﬁcant relation between judgment
magnitudes for oneself and for peers. There was no diﬀerence between
the grades, t(87)= 0.02, p= .99.
If relative accuracy for SSJs and PSJs would be consistent, this
would indicate that children who have higher relative monitoring ac-
curacy when scoring own responses also have higher monitoring ac-
curacy when scoring peers, and vice versa. However, Pearson correla-
tions between relative accuracy of SSJs and PSJs were low and not
signiﬁcant; overall r=−0.028, p= .791; r=−0.10 for fourth grade,
and −0.11 for sixth grade. Further, we investigated whether measures
of absolute accuracy were related between one's SSJs and PSJs. Pearson
correlations between absolute accuracy values of SSJs and PSJs were
signiﬁcantly higher than zero, overall r=0.365, p < .001; r=0.15,
p= .29 for fourth grade and r=0.52, p < .001 for sixth grade. This
implies consistency between absolute accuracy when scoring self and
when scoring peers for sixth, but not for fourth graders.
Fig. 3. Absolute accuracy of self and peer score judgments. (Error bars indicate
the 95% conﬁdence interval.)
Table 2
Self- and peer-score-judgments per test response type.
Omission error Commission error 1 idea (partially correct) 2 ideas (partially correct) 3 ideas (fully correct)
Grade 4 N 47 46 51 45 10
SSJ 0.56 (0.67) 0.95 (0.66) 1.22 (0.47) 1.91 (0.53) 2.47 (0.83)
PSJ 0.38 (0.49) 0.75 (0.52) 1.08 (0.55) 1.66 (0.68) 2.67 (0.70)
Grade 6 N 35 19 40 44 38
SSJ 0.13 (0.40) 0.82 (0.61) 1.10 (0.36) 1.87 (0.31) 2.72 (0.34)
PSJ 0.12 (0.30) 0.66 (0.60) 1.10 (0.38) 1.82 (0.34) 2.62 (0.45)
Note. Standard deviations of the mean in parentheses.
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5. Discussion
With the present study, we aimed to investigate whether elementary
school children are able to make accurate monitoring judgments when
scoring test responses of themselves and their peers. To support chil-
dren to make accurate judgments, they could inspect detailed feedback
parsed into separate idea units. Lipko et al. (2009) showed that this
idea-unit feedback can be highly beneﬁcial for children when self-
scoring; yet, it remains an open question to what extent it beneﬁts peer
judgment accuracy. To investigate potential developmental diﬀerences
in judgment accuracy, fourth and sixth graders were compared. With
use of pretest scores, we investigated eﬀects of individual diﬀerences in
prior knowledge on judgment accuracy. Finally, we addressed to what
extent there was consistency between children's self and peer judg-
ments.
5.1. Self and peer monitoring
RQ1 addresses whether there are diﬀerences in monitoring judg-
ments and monitoring accuracy between SSJs and PSJs. To answer this
question, children's judgment accuracy was investigated with measures
of relative accuracy (a correlational measure assessing how well chil-
dren can discriminate between responses of high quality and responses
of lower quality, Nelson, 1984) and measures of absolute accuracy
(quantifying whether judgments deviate from performance, these
measures either indicate accurate monitoring, over- or under-
conﬁdence, Pieschl, 2009). Combining these two indices of judgment
accuracy may give ﬁne-grained insights into children's skills and lim-
itations when assessing performance quality.
Our hypothesis that judgments are more accurate for peers than for
oneself is only conﬁrmed with measures of absolute accuracy, and not
with measures of relative accuracy. Replicating Lipko et al. (2009) and
Van Loon and Roebers (2017), children's relative accuracy was high
when scoring their own and their peers' performance. This shows that
when inspecting feedback, children were well able to distinguish be-
tween responses of high and low quality for themselves as well as for
peers. However, even though children could use feedback standards to
score the test responses, only few children were able to accurately score
all responses (8.3% of the sample was fully accurate when scoring own
responses and 7.3% when scoring peer responses). Measures of absolute
accuracy may give more ﬁne-grained insights into the match between
children's judgment magnitudes and the objective scoring criteria.
Findings show that children gave higher scores to their own answers
than to the answers that were given by their peers, and absolute
judgment accuracy was better for PSJs than for SSJs.
The fact that judgment magnitudes were lower and more con-
servative for peers than for oneself beneﬁtted judgment accuracy for
commission errors when scoring peers. The analyses for the diﬀerent
test response types show that children were particularly overconﬁdent
for their own commission errors. Even though these responses were
entirely inaccurate, children gave themselves credit for these errors
when making SSJs. Although the feedback standards showed the exact
idea units a response should consist of, it seemed that children may
have interpreted it such that it ﬁtted their answers. Interestingly, when
scoring the responses of their peers, children were better able to re-
cognize that commission errors were incorrect, and that these should
not receive credit. This may indicate that they were better able to apply
the content of the feedback standards when scoring PSJs.
Judgments for oneself seem to be based on experiential cues related
to subjective insights into learning and retrieval (Koriat & Ma'ayan,
2005). Possibly, when making commission errors, experiences that test
responses are retrieved from memory and subsequently written down
may hinder children to make accurate judgments (Benjamin, Bjork, &
Schwartz, 1998). That is, when an answer is easily produced, persons
often believe that this answer then must be correct. However, such
experiential cues do not seem to play a similar role when children judge
a peer (as they had no information about the learning and retrieval
experiences of their peer). This may make it easier to recognize com-
mission errors made by others. Furthermore, when scoring peer per-
formance, children may have been less vulnerable to a wishful thinking
bias (Destan et al., 2017). Even though it may have been challenging to
make eﬀective use of feedback when scoring own answers due to wishes
to perform well, these wishes may not have hindered children to apply
the feedback when judging peer performance. Further, better-than-
average biases (Alicke & Govorun, 2005) and a tendency to conﬂate
eﬀort with ability (Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005) may only play a role when
judging oneself, but not when judging others.
Also when scoring partially correct responses, children gave them-
selves more credit than they gave their peers. But although judgments
for others' responses were lower than judgments for themselves, this did
not necessarily reﬂect a better ability to judge performance for peers.
That is, when judging the quality of partially correct responses, children
became too strict and underconﬁdent when scoring their peers' per-
formance.
5.2. Developmental diﬀerences in judgment accuracy
We investigated whether there were developmental diﬀerences in
judgment accuracy (RQ2) and hypothesized that the sixth grade chil-
dren would make more accurate judgments for themselves and for their
peers than fourth graders. This hypothesis was conﬁrmed with mea-
sures of relative accuracy. Sixth graders were more accurate than fourth
graders, such that they more systematically assigned low credit points
to less learned concepts, and higher points to better learned concepts.
However, although measures of relative accuracy show better dis-
crimination skills for the older age group, recognition of commission
errors did not improve for the older children, indicating that this re-
mained challenging for both age groups. For complex metacognitive
judgment tasks, developmental eﬀects are often not seen until children
are 12 years and older (Roebers, 2017). The ﬁnding that overconﬁdence
for commission errors did not improve with age, may indicate that for
children, commission errors are the hardest to notice and to correct. To
address this assumption, future research could include older age groups
(e.g., compare elementary school children with adolescents) to in-
vestigate development of error recognition skills.
Moreover, analyses of absolute accuracy show eﬀects of grade for
self and peer judgments. For SSJs, absolute accuracy was better for sixth
than for fourth graders. Fourth graders were overconﬁdent and gave
themselves more credit when judging themselves than sixth graders.
However, although children were more conservative when scoring their
peers than when scoring themselves, for fourth graders, being more
conservative for peers led to lower, and more accurate PSJs than SSJs,
whereas sixth graders were underconﬁdent when judging performance
of their peers. That is, although older children gave lower judgments
when judging performance than younger children, this did not ne-
cessarily beneﬁt judgment accuracy. Instead, lowering judgments for
peers led sixth graders to become too strict.
5.3. Eﬀects of prior knowledge on judgment accuracy
RQ3 concerns eﬀects of prior knowledge on SSJs and PSJs; to ad-
dress this question, we investigated eﬀects of accurate and inaccurate
prior knowledge. The hypothesis that prior knowledge would aﬀect
judgments for oneself was only partially conﬁrmed. Relative accuracy
was not aﬀected by children's prior knowledge. However, although
absolute accuracy of SSJs was not aﬀected by accurate prior knowledge,
children's inaccurate prior knowledge aﬀected absolute accuracy. That
is, inaccurate prior knowledge led to more conﬁdent scoring and
overestimation of the quality of answers when making judgments about
one's own performance. Interestingly, and in line with Cameron et al.
(1997), inaccurate prior knowledge did not only lead to more con-
ﬁdence when monitoring oneself, but also when judging peers. This
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study is the ﬁrst to show that children's inaccurate prior knowledge may
not only be disadvantageous for self-monitoring (cf. Van Loon et al.,
2013a), but that these disadvantages may also transfer when children
judge performance of others.
5.4. Consistency between self- and peer-monitoring
Our fourth research question addresses consistency within students
of self- and peer judgment magnitudes and judgment accuracy. The
magnitudes of self- and peer judgments for the diﬀerent test items were
not consistent within persons. This shows that children clearly diﬀer-
entiated between their own and their peers' performance, and did not
give peers similar scores as they gave themselves. Further, the ﬁnding
that indices of relative accuracy were not related when scoring oneself
and when scoring a peer indicate that children who were well able to
discriminate between correct and incorrect responses for themselves
could not necessarily do so for their peers, and vice versa.
Interestingly, measures of absolute judgment accuracy were con-
sistent between SSJs and PSJs for sixth, but not for fourth graders.
Although relations between absolute accuracy of self and peer judg-
ments were low and nonexistent for fourth graders, for sixth graders,
the correlation between absolute accuracy values for SSJs and PSJs was
moderate to high. Possibly, consistency in absolute accuracy may de-
velop between fourth and sixth grade. Van der Stel and Veenman
(2008) showed that around the age of 12, metacognitive skills seem to
develop into a general competence that is applicable across tasks and
domains. Although previous research showed domain generality of
metacognitive accuracy when scoring one's own performance on dif-
ferent kinds of tasks (Kleitman & Moscrop, 2010), the present research
may imply that this general metacognitive competence may also carry
on when scoring others. That is, our ﬁndings showed that around the
age of 12, children who were more optimistic when scoring themselves
were also more optimistic when scoring their peers. Future research
should investigate whether these ﬁndings on potential development in
consistency of absolute accuracy can be replicated.
5.5. Limitations and suggestions for future research
In the present study, we used actual educational content for both
age groups. Therefore, task materials were diﬀerent, and further, sixth
graders studied more concepts than fourth graders. Although use of
these tasks may make our ﬁndings educationally relevant, using dif-
ferent materials for both age groups also brings limitations when
aiming to compare the groups. Although the ﬁndings on better self-
monitoring accuracy for older than younger children replicate previous
developmental research on monitoring accuracy (Schneider & Löﬄer,
2016), our ﬁndings on monitoring accuracy need to be interpreted with
care. Although we had a large sample size and analyses of relative and
absolute accuracy included the full sample, the analyses for the dif-
ferent response types only included a part of the sample. That is, few
fourth graders made fully correct responses that contained all the three
learned idea units, and several sixth grade students did not make
commission errors. Further research is needed to acquire insight into
replicability and generalizability of these ﬁndings, particularly ﬁndings
for the diﬀerent response types.
Moreover, it should be noted that metacognitive development
cannot be considered in disconnection from cognitive development.
That is, although sixth graders were less overconﬁdent than fourth
graders, they also learned more concepts as reﬂected by higher task
performance. Further, although not measured, presumably sixth gra-
ders were more advanced than fourth graders when it comes to reading
and writing skills, memory capacity, attention span, and processing
speed (Bjorklund & Causey, 2017). It also seems likely that older chil-
dren were better able to utilize the feedback in a more eﬃcient way
than the younger children. Fourth graders seemed to make more mis-
takes than sixth graders when scoring responses, as indicated by the
ﬁnding that they sometimes awarded credit when no response was
produced at all (i.e., omissions errors). This may indicate that for the
younger children, it was more demanding to simultaneously inspect
feedback and task responses and to mark the check box. Because cog-
nitive and metacognitive development are likely to interact, assump-
tions about improvement of monitoring accuracy skills for the older age
group need to be evaluated cautiously, and these need to be replicated
with similar as well as other types of tasks.
Research shows that ﬁrst judging the outcomes of a peer may sup-
port children to subsequently monitor their own learning progress and
to improve learning achievement (Hwang et al., 2014). In this study,
the order of making self- and peer judgments was randomized, that is,
half of the children ﬁrst made SSJs whereas the other half ﬁrst made the
PSJs. Comparison between these two groups did not show any diﬀer-
ences in judgment accuracy. This seems to indicate that only asking
children to engage in peer scoring before self-scoring is not suﬃcient to
improve monitoring judgments. Findings also imply that children did
not automatically adjust their own judgments after being presented
with judgments that were made by a peer. In the present study, children
were not speciﬁcally instructed to reﬂect on their judgment experi-
ences, and to inspect and make use of the judgments made by their
peer. Possibly, to beneﬁt from collaborative scoring activities, children
need speciﬁc instructions about how to use the judgments that are made
by others (Hurme, Palonen, & Järvelä, 2006). Future research should
investigate eﬀects of instructions to explicitly compare judgments on
scoring accuracy and collaborative learning. Moreover, future research
should address whether children would also continue to inspect, judge
and compare their own and their peers' learning when they are not
explicitly prompted to do so.
Furthermore, in this study, we did not acquire insights into the
social relations between peers who scored each other's work, and
whether they considered each other as friends. This may inﬂuence to
what extent children are more critical about their peers than about
themselves; elementary school children may only show a self-serving
bias when assessing a non-friend, but not when assessing a friend's
performance (Posey & Smith, 2003). Future research could investigate
how interpersonal relations between peers aﬀect the judgment process
and outcomes.
5.6. Implications and conclusions
When aiming to target better recognition of commission errors,
designing collaborative learning activities during which children have
to score each other's answers may be promising. Commission errors are
hard to detect and improve (Rawson & Dunlosky, 2007), and our
ﬁndings show that peer-judgments for these errors are clearly more
accurate. It seems that children may ﬁnd it more motivating to catch
their peers' mistakes than their own (conﬁrming ﬁndings by Okita,
2014). Therefore, peer-scoring activities may be valuable to support
and improve error detection. The ﬁnding that children can accurately
discriminate between correct and incorrect performance of their peers'
and recognize others' errors indicates that performance does not always
need to be judged by teachers, but that students themselves could
collaborate on scoring. This could potentially free up time resources for
teachers. Moreover, when using online tutoring systems, making use of
peer feedback could be a valuable possibility to give children insight
into how well they are progressing on tasks. Online tutoring systems
can give detailed performance feedback when using multiple choice
questions and when learning memory materials (such as when learning
second language vocabulary). However, when more complex learning
materials are used and students have to show that they understood the
gist, such systems are less eﬀective in giving feedback. Probably, peer
feedback may be more useful with such kinds of tasks.
Further, learning from and with peers may also have long-term
impacts on children's social learning skills, and their ability to consider
diﬀerent perspectives. Nevertheless, it is important to note that our
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ﬁndings show that children are sometimes too strict with scoring when
their peers' test responses have high quality. This indicates that, al-
though such activities are likely to be very useful to improve colla-
borative learning, at the same time, teachers should instruct children
how to use scoring criteria, and they should closely monitor the quality
of self and peer scoring.
To conclude, children were better at error detection when in-
specting others' work than when scoring their own performance.
However, they were also more conservative for their peers, and un-
derestimated peer performance more than their own performance.
Although sixth graders were more accurate in discrimination between
high and low quality responses than fourth graders, at the same time,
they were too strict for their peers. Moreover, children's inaccurate
prior knowledge led to less accurate and more overconﬁdent judg-
ments, both when judging themselves and their peers. Further, con-
sistency of judgment accuracy may be developing; absolute accuracy of
judgments was consistent between scores for oneself and a peer for
sixth, but not for fourth graders. In sum, the present ﬁndings imply that,
when inspecting feedback standards, children are able to judge both
their own and their peers' responses. However, when implementing co-
scoring activities, it is important to be aware that its accuracy is af-
fected by individual diﬀerences in children's age and prior knowledge,
particularly inaccurate prior knowledge.
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